Associations between structures, processes and outcomes in inter-municipal cooperation in out-of-hours services in Norway: A survey study by Arntsen, Bjørnulf et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Social Science & Medicine
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed
Associations between structures, processes and outcomes in inter-municipal
cooperation in out-of-hours services in Norway: A survey study
Bjørnulf Arntsena,∗, Dag Olaf Torjesenb, Tor-Ivar Karlsenc
a Faculty of Health and Sport Science, Center for Care Research – Southern Norway, University of Agder, Jon Lilletuns vei 13, 4879, Grimstad, Norway
b Department of Political Science and Management, University of Agder, Universitetsveien 25, 4630, Kristiansand, Norway
c Faculty of Health and Sport Science, University of Agder, Jon Lilletuns vei 13, 4879, Grimstad, Norway
A B S T R A C T
Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) has gained widespread recognition as a beneficial strategy for improving efficiency and quality in the provision of out-of-hours
emergency care services (OOH services). Little attention, however, has been given to the additional costs of cooperation and the relational processes through which
benefits and costs are likely to result. Based on survey data from 266 (77%) Norwegian municipalities involved in IMC in OOH services in 2015, this study aimed to
investigate how the structure (governance form, complexity and stability) and quality (trust and consensus) of cooperation processes interact to influence the
perceived outcomes (benefits and costs) of IMC in OOH services. Using Structural equation modeling, we found trust and consensus fully mediated the association
between the structure and outcomes of IMC. More specifically, the results suggest that cooperation structures characterized by centralized governance, stability over
time, and reduced complexity were likely to enhance the benefits and reduce the costs of IMC through trust and consensus.
1. Introduction
Throughout Europe, the provision of out-of-hours emergency care
services (OOH services) are increasingly being organized through var-
ious forms of cooperative arrangements that are expected to help ser-
vice providers cope with steadily rising pressure in terms of increased
efficiency and service quality (Grol et al., 2006; Huibers et al., 2009;
Huibers et al., 2014; Leibowitz et al., 2003; Leutgeb et al., 2014; Philips
et al., 2010; Smits et al., 2012). Norway is no exception to these de-
velopments. In Norway, 428 municipalities are by law responsible for
providing primary health care to all inhabitants, including OOH ser-
vices. During the last decades, however, the organisation of OOH ser-
vices in Norway has changed from municipal-based to larger inter-
municipal cooperation (IMC) (Morken et al., 2016; Norwegian Ministry
of Health and Care Services (2015). As many as 80% of all Norwegian
municipalities provided these types of services through voluntary IMC
in 2015 (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2015).
Given this widespread recognition of scaling up OOH services
through cooperation, it seems that most of the literature has primarily
been focusing on assessing the expected benefits, such as reduced service
costs (Broekman et al., 2017; Brogan et al., 1998; Grol et al., 2006;
Hansen and Munck, 1998; Smits et al., 2017), enhanced service quality
(Giesen et al., 2011; Hansen and Munck, 1998; Shipman et al., 2000;
Smits et al., 2012; Tranberg et al., 2018) and reduced workloads for GPs
(Giesen et al., 2011; Grol et al., 2006; van Uden and Crebolder, 2004).
Although important, we argue, this literature tends to ignore some
important aspects that limit our understanding of the complex and
dynamic nature of this type of cooperation and how it can be improved.
First, it does not account for the additional costs that are likely to result
from providing OOH services through cooperation rather than in-
dividually, such as the increased time and resources needed to reach
joint decisions and coordinate joint activities (Pettigrew et al., 2019).
Second, by focusing solely on end products and outcomes, it leaves the
relational process of cooperation a “black box”, thus neglecting to con-
sider how benefits and costs may depend on the quality of cooperation
processes (trust and consensus) and how they are structured (govern-
ance form, complexity and stability) (Provan and Sydow, 2008).
From a practical perspective, we argue that just as important as
assessing “what” outcomes are achieved from cooperation is asking
“how” they are achieved. The purpose of this study was to provide
health managers, practitioners and policymakers with a better under-
standing of the complex nature of IMC in OOH services, asking how the
structure and quality of cooperation processes interact to influence the
perceived benefits and costs of being involved in IMC in OOH services.
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Theory and research on inter-organizational relations (IOR) pro-
vides a valuable starting point from which to analyze the above re-
search question, and has formed the basis for two frameworks
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specifically developed for studying cooperation among health-care or-
ganizations (D'Amour et al., 2008; Lasker et al., 2001). IOR specifically
turns the focus towards the factors that enable and constrain “relations
between and among organizations that are pursuing a mutual interest
while also remaining independent and autonomous, thus retaining se-
parate interests” (Cropper et al., 2009, p. 8). Several such factors have
been identified over the years, and Provan and Sydow (2008) suggest
categorizing these according to three interactive dimensions that are
sequential in time: structures, processes and outcomes. Drawing from
parts of this literature, we developed a conceptual model for analyzing
the complex and dynamic nature of IMC in OOH services with the
quality of cooperation processes (trust and consensus) included as a
mediator between the structure and outcomes of IMC (Fig. 1).
2.1. Outcomes of cooperation
When evaluating beneficial outcomes of IOR involvement, Provan
and Sydow (2008) suggest considering three types of outcomes that also
reflect the expected benefits from providing OOH services through co-
operation (Grol et al., 2006; Huibers et al., 2009, 2014; Leibowitz et al.,
2003; Leutgeb et al., 2014; Philips et al., 2010; Smits et al., 2012). The
first type, financial performance, refers to the potential for reducing
service costs resulting from economies of scale and efficiency gains. The
second type, non-financial performance, includes increased service
quality and a stronger workforce, as cooperation is expected to facil-
itate joint investment and resource exchanges, reduce workloads and
ease recruitment of GPs, allow GPs to work in larger teams, etc. Finally,
innovation and learning may also be obtained from cooperation because
cooperation allows for spreading best practices, shared training pro-
grams, peer-support, etc.
However, even though cooperation may result in a wide range of
beneficial outcomes, bringing together several legally autonomous or-
ganizations with potentially different interests and preferences usually
comes with a cost (Cropper et al., 2009; D'Amour et al., 2008; Hulst and
Montfort, 2007). In their review study, Pettigrew et al. (2019) identi-
fied several potential costs that may result from providing health-care
services through cooperation rather than individually, including in-
creased time and resources spent on collaborative decision-making pro-
cesses and coordinating joint activities. Thus, we believe, as do Provan
and Sydow (2008, p. 707), that the “costs of establishing and main-
taining an IOR must be considered in any evaluation effort and ba-
lanced carefully against more positive evaluation criteria”, and more-
over, that minimizing these costs may be just as effective as providing
additional benefits (Lasker et al., 2001).
2.2. The quality and outcomes of cooperation
The term cooperation processes refers to those actions and activities
that are likely to result in effective outcomes, and the idea that the
quality of these processes may be compromised due to lack of trust and
consensus is central to IOR (Benson, 1975; D'Amour et al., 2008; Head,
2008; Lasker et al., 2001; Levine and White, 1961; Popp et al., 2014;
Provan and Sydow, 2008; Tavares and Feiock, 2014). This is also a key
concern in two frameworks developed for analyzing cooperation be-
tween health-care organizations, although these frameworks emphasize
somewhat different aspects of the two concepts. D'Amour et al. (2008)
point to lack of competence trust, or trust in the other participants'
competence to assume their responsibilities and absence of shared goals
as important obstacles to success. Lasker et al. (2001), on their side,
emphasize lack of contractual trust, or trust in the other participants to
follow through on their contractual obligations and responsibilities and
an overall high level of conflict, as important barriers to success. In
addition, there is a need to consider disagreement about the distribu-
tion of costs (fairness) as a potential obstacle to effective cooperation
(D'Amour et al., 2008; Tavares and Feiock, 2014).
What all of these different aspects of trust and consensus have in
common is that they are likely to increase the perceived risk and un-
certainty among the participants about whether the relational process
of cooperation will be satisfactory (relational risk) and ultimately
whether the cooperation will perform as expected (performance risk)
(Das and Teng, 2001). These risks are expected to increase the time and
resources needed to make decisions and coordinate and monitor ac-
tivities, as well as making the participants less willing to make the
necessary investments and resource exchanges to produce beneficial
outcomes (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007; Head, 2008; Korthagen and Klijn,
2014; Sako, 2006). Based on these assumptions, we propose the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H1. Trust will be positively related to benefits and negatively to costs.
H2. Consensus will be positively related to benefits and negatively to
costs.
2.3. The structure, quality and outcomes of cooperation
The term “structure” has been used to describe a variety of prop-
erties of IOR, and Provan and Sydow (2008, p. 697) note that “struc-
tural indicators of IORs are those that focus on the connections between
organizations”, including the governance, complexity and stability of
these connections. What they all have in common, however, is that they
are expected to have the potential to influence the quality of coopera-
tion processes and ultimately the outcomes of cooperation (Cropper
et al., 2009; Provan and Sydow, 2008). Our basic assumption will
therefore be that the relationship between these structural factors and
the final outcomes of IMC will be indirect and mediated by trust and
consensus between the participants.
Complexity refers to the number of organizations involved in the
cooperation process (Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig Jr, 1976). As the
number of participants increases, so does heterogeneity and the number
of potential relationships that must be coordinated and integrated into
joint action, thus making it harder to reach consensus and maintaining
the dense interaction needed to build trusting relationships (Milward
and Provan, 2003; Provan and Kenis, 2007; Van de Ven et al., 1976). By
virtue of undermining the quality of the cooperation processes in this
way, we expect complexity to increase the costs of cooperation and
making the achievement beneficial outcome more difficult. Stability
refers in this study to the overall maturity of the cooperation (Jacobsen,
2014; Milward and Provan, 2000) and is an important condition for
generating the predictability and familiarity needed to develop trust
and consensus among participants (Mandell and Keast, 2008), thus
having the potential to reduce the costs and increase the benefits of
cooperation. The more complex concept of governance “involves the use
of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate
resources and to coordinate and control joint actions” (Provan and
Kenis, 2007, p. 231). Governance constitutes an important part of the
analytical frameworks of D'Amour et al. (2008) and Lasker et al. (2001).
Both argue for the importance of having some central authorities to
provide a clear direction, clarify expectations and responsibilities and
Fig. 1. Conceptual model of the association between the structure, process and
outcomes of IMC in OOH services.
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play a strategic role in coordinating collaborative processes in health
care. From a purely managerial perspective, the use of more centralized
governance mechanisms may thus contribute to improving the co-
operation processes and subsequent outcomes. Findings to support this
view are found in several studies of inter-organizational collaboration
within the context of health care (Pettigrew et al., 2019; Provan and
Milward, 2010; Sheaff et al., 2015; Sheaff et al., 2014).
Given the great variation in Norwegian IMC in OOH services with
regard to the number of participants involved, their stability and their
governance form (Morken et al., 2016), we hypothesize that:
H3. Complexity will be negatively related to benefits and positively to
costs through trust and consensus.
H4. Stability will be positively related to benefits and negatively to
costs through trust and consensus.
H5. Centralized forms of governance will be positively related to
benefits and negatively to costs through trust and consensus.
3. Methods and materials
3.1. Study design and data collection
This is a cross-sectional study based on survey data obtained from
266 Norwegian municipalities involved in IMC in OOH services, con-
ducted between October 2015 and January 2016 and approved by the
Norwegian Centre for Research Data (project number 43163).
The 28th of October 2015, we invited the top health manager in all
428 Norwegian municipalities to participate in an extensive net-based
survey concerning their municipality's involvement in and experiences
with IMC in five different types of health services. The data used in this
study were obtained from part two of this survey that dealt specifically
with IMC involvement in OOH services. After three reminders, we re-
ceived responses from 288 Norwegian municipalities participating in
IMC in OOH services in 2016 (Morken et al., 2016). Twenty cases were
deleted from the dataset due to a large amount of missing data and two
additional cases due to duplication, thus leaving us with a total sample
of 266 municipalities, representing 77% of all Norwegian munici-
palities taking part in IMC in OOH services in 2016 (Morken et al.,
2016) (Fig. 2)
3.2. Questionnaire
The content of the questionnaire was based on core concepts and
questions derived from earlier studies on IMC and frameworks
specifically developed for analyzing inter-organizational and inter-
professional cooperation within the context of health care (Cropper
et al., 2009; D'Amour et al., 2008; Jacobsen, 2014; Provan and Sydow,
2008). The questionnaire consisted of three main sections reflecting the
dimensions in our conceptual model. Three items concerned the
structure of the IMC (number of participants, governance form and
stability), six items concerned the process of the IMC (trust and con-
sensus), and six concerned the outcomes (benefits and costs). The
questionnaire was pre-tested on a small sample of representatives for
the target group of the study, and only minor adjustments were done.
3.3. Study setting
This study was conducted within a Norwegian health-care context,
reflecting a decentralized and publicly funded Scandinavian welfare
model based on core values of universalism and equality where all
municipalities are assigned the same set of legislation, statutory tasks,
and financing system (Leknes et al., 2013). Health-care arrangements in
Norway represent a division of responsibility between two political-
administrative levels where the state is responsible for providing spe-
cialist health-care services, and the local municipalities are responsible
for providing primary health-care services, including OOH services.
The setting was Norwegian municipalities voluntarily taking part in
formalized IMC set up between two or more municipalities to provide
statutory OOH services to their inhabitants when the GP's office is
closed (usually from 3 p.m. to 8 a.m. on weekdays and 24 h during the
weekend). More specifically, this responsibility includes (1) treating
acute medical conditions where the patient does not need hospital
treatment, (2) diagnosing medical conditions requiring referral or
hospitalization and channelling these patients to the appropriate level
of treatment, and (3) diagnosing, providing primary treatment for, and
stabilizing medical conditions that are acutely life-threatening and that
require rapid hospitalization (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care
Services, 1997). These IMCs are staffed with GPs working in the par-
ticipating municipalities on a rota basis, who are obliged to take part in
OOH duties (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2012),
sometimes together with additional auxiliary professionals. (Norwegian
Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2015).
According to Morken et al. (2016), there were 101 unique co-
operative arrangements providing OOH services in 2016, which varied
in terms of their size and organizational form. Apart from simple con-
tractual agreements without any governance arrangement established to
coordinate joint actions, the Norwegian legal framework allows for
various ways of organizing and governing these types of IMC arrange-
ments. The most common way of organizing IMC in OOH services in
Fig. 2. Participant flow chart.
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Norway is to centralize the operational and administrative governance
responsibility to one of the participating municipalities, which acts as a
host municipality (based on the Law on Local Government Act §28b), or
to an external and legally independent inter-municipal company with
unlimited liability and its own administration (based on the Law on
Inter-Municipal Companies). There are, however, also more decen-
tralized and less formalized forms of IMC in OOH services in use such as
joint boards (based on the Local Government Act §27) in which all the
participating municipalities share the responsibility for governing the
IMC.
3.4. Statistical methods
Structural equation modeling (SEM) in AMOS (SPSS) was used to
analyze the data. SEM is particularly well suited to analyzing complex
and multifaceted constructs and concepts like many of thoseincluded in
our analysis (trust, consensus, outcomes and costs). Furthermore, SEM
also lets us analyze complex “systems” of relationships as it allows
several dependent and intermediate variables in the analysis simulta-
neously, accounting for both direct and indirect effects. It also allows us
to estimate model fit, which indicates the extent to which our model fits
the data used in the analysis rather than just how well the predictors
explain the dependent or endogenous variables (Tabachnick and Fidell,
2007). Prior to the SEM, the validity of the constructs and fit of the
measurement model were examined by principal component analysis
(PCA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and internal consistency
(Cronbach's alpha). Little's MCAR test was used for missing value ana-
lysis, and a bootstrapping analysis was performed to account for non-
normal data. Harman's single-factor test was conducted to account for
common method bias.
3.5. Variables and measures
3.5.1. Dependent and intermediate variables
As mentioned, there are likely to be several types of outcomes in-
volved in IMC in OOH services, some of which are difficult to assess
through single and objective performance measures. We therefore apply
composite outcome-measures based on multiple indicators as perceived
by local health managers representing the organizations involved in the
cooperation (Kenis and Provan, 2009; Mandell and Keast, 2008; Provan
and Sydow, 2008). Our dependent outcome variables (benefits and
costs) and intermediate process variables (trust and consensus) were
based on a total of 12 items asking respondents to indicate on a five-
point Likert scale the extent of or agreement on different aspects of their
IMC involvement (ranging from 1, “to a very little extent”/“totally
disagree,” to 5, “to a very large extent”/“totally agree”).
Our measure of benefits was based on four items in which re-
spondents were asked to indicate the extent to which their involvement
in IMC in OOH services had contributed to (1) increased service quality,
(2) increased professional “robustness”, (3) increased learning and in-
novation, and (4) reduced service costs and more efficient use of
resources. The costs of IMC were based on two items asking respondents
to what extent they agreed that their involvement in IMC in OOH ser-
vices had resulted in (1) more time-consuming and demanding deci-
sion-making processes, and (2) more time-consuming activities (writing
reports, attending meetings, traveling, etc.). Trust was measured based
on three items asking the respondents to what extent they trusted the
other participants to (1) have the necessary competence and resources
to follow through on their tasks and commitments, (2) loyally follow
through on their contractual obligations, and (3) not withdraw from the
cooperation if any conflicts should occur. Consensus was measured
based on three items asking respondents to what extent they agreed to
the following (1) that the participants share the same goals, (2) that the
participants agree on the distribution of costs, and (3) that the level of
conflict is low.
3.5.2. Independent variables
Our independent variables (complexity, stability and governance
form) were measured at the cooperation level. Complexity was mea-
sured by the number of participants in each unique IMC. Stability was
measured by calculating the average number of years that the muni-
cipalities had been part of each unique IMC. Governance form was
measured by asking respondents to tick from a list the organizational
form and legal superstructure that were used for the specific IMC.
Centralized forms of governance were defined as IMC arrangements
where the administrative governance responsibility was delegated to
either a host municipality or an inter-municipal company. These two
forms were compared to the more decentralized forms of IMC governed
by a joint board or based on a simple written agreement without any
legally defined administrative governance entity (reference category).
In Table 1, below, we present the descriptive statistics of the de-
pendent, intermediate and independent variables included in the ana-
lysis and the correlations between these variables.
3.5.3. Reliability and validity
To test the structural validity of the dependent and intermediate
variables, i.e. to make sure that the 12 items included in our analysis
tapped into different dimensions, we conducted a principal component
analysis (PCA) using direct oblimin rotation. Prior to the PCA, we as-
sessed the suitability of data for analysis, finding correlation coeffi-
cients above 0.3 among the 12 items, a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value of
0.79 and a p-value < .05 in a Bartlett's test of sphericity. We extracted
four components and found all items loading as theoretically expected
(Table 2), explaining 68% of the total variance. Furthermore, the results
showed high factor loadings above 0.50, demonstrating convergent
validity, and no high cross-loadings, indicating divergent validity.
These four dimensions were also checked for internal consistency
through calculation of Cronbach's alpha coefficients, and all showed
values above the widely accepted cut-off value of 0.7, except “trust”
(0.695) (Table 2). We also performed a confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) in AMOS (SPSS) to test the fit of the measurement model of latent
factors with our data. The results of the CFA showed that the overall fit
Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations.
Variables Mean (SD) Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Benefits 3.85 (0.76) 1 5 1
2. Costs 2.59 (1.12) 1 5 -.23** 1
3. Trust 4.06 (0.57) 2.3 5 .26** -.44** 1
4. Consensus 4.44 (0.83) 1 5 .30** -.35** .41** 1
5. Complexity of the IMC 5.04 (2.69) 2 15 -.14* .12 -.14* -.11 1
6. Stability of the IMC 11.37 (4.98) 2 23 .06 -.11 .14* .02 -.07 1
7. Governed by a host 0.56 (0.49) 0 1 .11 -.00 .04 .07 .13* -.07 1
8. Governed by a company 0.11 (0.31) 0 1 -.06 .04 .01 .06 .23** -.06 -.39** 1
9. Governed by a board or a simple contract 0.33 (0.47) 0 1 -.08 -.03 -.05 -.11 -.29** .11 -.80** -.24**
Note: **p < .01; *p < .05, N = 266.
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of our measurement model was good (GFI = 0.969, CFI = 0.992,
RMSEA = 0.026, PCLOSE = .947).
3.5.4. Missing values and common method bias
After making sure that the missing values in the dataset were missing
at random (Little's MCAR test p > .05), we replaced these with the
series mean, except in the case of our independent variables. Our in-
dependent variables were measured on a cooperation level, where
missing values were replaced with the group mean (in the case of sta-
bility and complexity) or the same value (in the case of governance
form) as the municipalities belonging to the same unique IMC
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). To account for non-normal data, we
performed a bootstrapping analysis to estimate the potential effect of the
sample size and thus how stable or good our sample statistics are as an
estimate of the population parameter. The results from the boot-
strapping analysis showed that the results were consistent across 500,
1000, and 5000 bootstrap samples, with a non-significant Bollen-Stine
p-value (p > .05), indicating that our sample's values were not sig-
nificantly different from those of a larger sample (Bollen and Stine,
1992). One limitation is, however, that our data are self-reported and
based on the same source, namely a single application of a ques-
tionnaire with health care managers as respondents. To account for
common method bias, or variance that is due to the measurement method
rather than the constructs themselves (Podsakoff et al., 2003), we
performed a Harman's single-factor test, in which all study indicators
were inserted in a principal component analysis (unrotated). The result
showed that no one factor accounted for the majority of the explained
variance (i.e. not more than 32%), indicating that common method bias
does not appear to be a concern in this study.
4. Results
After testing several different structural SEM models, we ended up
with the best fitting model as displayed in Fig. 3, below, showing ex-
cellent model fit (GFI = 0.952, CFI = 0.986, PCLOSE = .991, and
RMSEA = 0.026). The results of our SEM analysis are displayed in
Fig. 3, which shows standardized regression coefficients (beta values)
on the arrows; the bracketed values in the boxes indicate the explained
variance (R2) Fig. 3.
SEM also allowed us to test the indirect effects of our exogenous
variables (stability, complexity, governance form) on the perceived
benefits and costs by performing a bias-corrected bootstrap method in
AMOS, requesting 2000 bootstrap samples with a bias-corrected con-
fidence interval of 0.95. These indirect effects are shown in Table 3.
Turning to our hypotheses, it appears that most are supported by the
data. Looking first at the relationship between the quality of the co-
operation processes and the perceived outcomes, the overall results
from our analysis suggest that the level of trust and consensus among
the participants seems to be crucial in determining the perceived out-
comes of IMC in OOH services. Trust showed a positive relationship to
perceived benefits and a strong negative relationship to costs (sup-
porting H1). Although consensus was found to be positively related to
benefits, no direct relationship was found to costs (partly supporting
H2). Rather, consensus seems to have a strong negative indirect effect
on costs through trust as indicated in Table 3. Not surprisingly, we
found consensus to have a strong positive relationship to trust.
Focusing now on the relationship between the structure and out-
comes of cooperation, the results from this study suggests that this re-
lationship seems to be fully mediated by trust and consensus. As in-
dicated in Table 3, we found structural complexity to be negatively
related to benefits and positively to costs through trust and consensus
(supporting H3). Although we found a negative and indirect relation-
ship between stability and costs through trust as expected, we found no
relationship to benefits (partly supporting H4). Compared to more de-
centralized forms of governance (reference), the two centralized forms
(host municipality or company) showed a moderate, but still sig-
nificant, positive relationship to benefits and negative to costs through
trust and consensus (supporting H5).
5. Discussion
Based on what we believe to be some of the limitations in the lit-
erature on inter-organizational cooperation in OOH services, this study
aimed to investigate how the structure and quality of cooperation processes
interact to influence the perceived benefits and costs associated with IMC in
OOH services. The results indicated that the quality of cooperation
processes seem to play a key role in improving the outcomes of IMC in
OOH services and acting as a full mediator of the relationship between
the structure and outcomes of IMC. More specifically we find co-
operation structures characterized by centralized governance, reduced
complexity and increased stability over time to be indirectly related to
enhanced benefits and/or reduced costs through trust and consensus.
The important role played by the quality of cooperation processes
found in this study lends strong support to the idea that trust and
consensus are likely to reduce the time and resources needed to make
decisions and coordinate joint activities, as well as increasing partici-
pants’ willingness to make the necessary investments to produce ben-
eficial outcomes (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007; Head, 2008; Korthagen
and Klijn, 2014; Sako, 2006). The practical implication of these findings
suggests that active efforts to build trust and consensus in IMC in OOH
services may pay off in terms of reduced costs and enhanced benefits.
This is also one of the key messages of Pettigrew et al. (2019) in their
recommendations for improving outcomes from scaling up GP services
through cooperation.
Trust and consensus seems to be particularly important for reducing
the perceived costs associated with IMC in OOH services. To understand
why, we believe that we must consider the risk and uncertainty in-
herent in IMC in OOH services (Tjerbo and Skinner, 2016), due to the
consequences of unsatisfactory cooperation (relational risk) and unmet
objectives (performance risk) (Das and Teng, 2001). There may be
several reasons for this. First, OOH services could be described as a type
of collective public service in which there is a need for fail-safe service
delivery (Warner, 2011) because the consequences of a potential
breakdown or failure could be particularly harmful as it would affect
many people in need of acute medical treatment. A second and related
argument is that IMC in OOH services requires participants to make
asset-specific investments (medical technology, equipment, infra-
structure, personnel, etc.) that may not be easy to deploy for alternative
uses or to attain separately if the cooperation were to fail or breakdown
(Tjerbo and Skinner, 2016). Finally, it could also be argued that OOH
Table 2
Principal component analysis and internal consistency of items measuring
perceived benefits, costs, trust and consensus in IMC in OOH services.
Items (abbreviations)
Benefits Costs Trust Consensus
Increased service quality (QUA) .851 -.078 .006 .004
Increased professional “robustness” (PRO) .844 -.021 -.126 .087
Increased learning and innovation (LEA) .804 .199 .136 -.067
Reduced service costs and more effective
use of resources (EFF)
.605 -.141 -.001 .025
More time-consuming activities (TIM) .017 .903 -.057 .080
More demanding decision-making
processes (DEC)
-.069 .784 -.047 -.082
Have sufficient resources (RES) .038 -.155 .714 .153
Will follow through with contractual
obligations (CON)
-.040 -.058 .756 .205
Will not withdraw if conflict (WIT) .022 .028 .774 -.121
Consensus on goals (GOA) .042 .078 .018 .845
Consensus on the distribution of costs (DIS) .021 -.129 -.030 .801
Low level of conflict (CON) -.018 .041 .057 .759
Cronbach's Alpha .778 .711 .695 .739
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services represent a type of service in which the measurement of out-
comes may be difficult (Tjerbo and Skinner, 2016), something that is
likely to increase the risk and uncertainty associated with cooperation.
Given that the quality of cooperation processes appears to play such
a critical role in enhancing the benefits and reducing the costs of IMC in
OOH services, it is important to ask what structures may help to im-
prove these processes and the subsequent outcomes. The results from
this study provide some suggestions.
First, our findings indicate that reducing complexity by limiting the
number of municipalities involved in IMC in OOH services may help to
improve the quality of cooperation processes and their outcomes. These
findings support the assumption that reaching the trust and consensus
needed to increase benefits and reducing the costs of cooperation will
be easier when there are fewer organizations to coordinate and in-
tegrate into joint action. (Milward and Provan, 2003; Provan and
Sydow, 2008; Van de Ven et al., 1976). This explanation also seems
reasonable given the great variation in the number of participants in
IMC in OOH services, ranging from dyads of municipalities to more
complex networks consisting of a large number of participants (Morken
et al., 2016). Second, the negative relationship found between the
stability of the cooperative arrangements and costs flowing through
trust found in this study suggests that building the trust necessary to
reduce costs is something that develops over time. This finding may
reflect the fact that as IMC in OOH services is sustained over time,
participants will be better able to consider other participants’ track
record of carrying out tasks and duties in the past, thus making their
behaviour and actions more predictable in the future (McAllister,
1995). In an early phase of cooperation, this type of track record may be
absent, leading to more uncertainty and less trust, something that ul-
timately will increase the time and effort needed to take decisions and
coordinate the cooperation The lack of relationship between stability
and consensus, may be due to the fact that most of the IMC arrange-
ments investigated in the study had already gone through the critical
initial phase of negotiating an agreement and dealing with conflicts
(Mandell and Keast, 2008).
Turning to the last structural variable, governance, our findings
suggest that centralizing the governance responsibility to a host mu-
nicipality or an inter-municipal company helps the participants build
the consensus and trust needed to enhance the benefits and reduce the
costs of cooperation. Given the relational and performance risks in-
volved in IMC in OOH services, we believe that these results support the
assertion that “governance structures which attenuate opportunism and
otherwise infuse confidence are evidently needed” (Williamson, 1979,
p. 242). Similar concerns have also been raised by the Norwegian
Ministry of Health and Care Services, 2015, which recommends that
IMC in OOH services be set up with a centralized and strong profes-
sional and administrative body that defines the division of responsi-
bilities and makes sure that participants are following up on agreements
(e.g., the distribution of resources, internal control routines, conflict
management, etc.). Moreover, in a recent evaluation of the legal fra-
mework regulating IMC in Norway, one of the recommendations was
that the least regulated and centralized forms of IMC (i.e., based on §27
with a common board or based on a simple written contract) be re-
placed by new forms of IMC embedded within a more regulated legal
framework to reduce uncertainty and disagreement between partici-
pants (Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and Modernization,
2016). An important notion in this regard, however, is that this largely





Complexity -.125** -.107** .181**
Governed by a host municipality .115* .069* -.080*
Governed by a company .112* .068* -.078*
Consensus .151 -.434**
Note: Standardized beta values (*p < .05; **p < .01).
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reflects a managerial perspective on IMC, a perspective that typically
values centralization as a tool for enhanced control and efficiency. The
recommendation of using more centralized governance forms would
not necessarily hold if we were to focus on other types of values and
outcomes such as involvement, interaction and flexibility.
The results from this study also suggest that efforts to build con-
sensus on central issues related to the goals of the cooperation, as well
as the distribution of costs, will have a major impact on the level of trust
between the participants.
5.1. Limitations
This study has some important limitations. First of all, in spite of the
qualitative and subjective nature of some of the concepts and factors
included in this study, the results is purely based on quantification of
survey data obtained from local health managers on items derived from
previous theory and research. Although valuable, this approach may
leave us with a somewhat narrow and unnuanced picture of the com-
plex phenomenon of IMC in OOH services. To gain a more in-depth and
nuanced understanding of IMC, future studies of may therefore benefit
greatly from triangulation of different methods and sources of data
(qualitative and quantitative) and obtained from different levels of
analysis (individual, organizational, network). A mixed method ap-
proach, using in-depth interviews or focus group discussions prior to
the development of the survey, would be particularly valuable as it may
help to “ensure construct and item applicability for respondents and
provide insights for interpreting survey results” (Human and Provan,
1997, p. 373). Finally, this study is based on cross-sectional data col-
lected at a single point in time focusing on IMC (Arntsen et al., 2018)
within a specific service area in the Norwegian context, and we must
therefore be careful about generalizing as the results cannot auto-
matically be assumed to hold for IMC in other types of services or
geographical contexts, or at other points in time. Future studies on IMC
should consider using longitudinal data collected at multiple points in
time, allowing for a more thorough analysis of how structures, pro-
cesses and outcomes develop over time.
6. Conclusion
In an effort to address what we believe to be some of the limitations
in the literature on inter-organizational cooperation in health services,
this study set out to investigate how the structure and quality of co-
operation processes interact to influence the perceived benefits and
costs of being involved in IMC in OOH services. Based on the results
from this study, we conclude that the structure and quality of co-
operation processes indeed seem to interact to influence the perceived
benefits and costs of involvement in IMC in OOH services. More spe-
cifically, we found that increased levels of trust and consensus between
participants were likely to enhance the perceived benefits and reduce
the costs of IMC involvement. Moreover, we found that adopting more
centralized forms of governance, limiting the number of participants,
and sustaining the cooperation over time helped the participants
building the trust and consensus needed to enhance benefits and reduce
costs of IMC involvement. These results help shed light on the relational
process, the “black box”, of IMC in OOH services and demonstrates the
need to go beyond simple assessments of end outcomes to consider the
internal structure and process through which benefits and costs are
likely to result. We believe that our findings provide local health
managers, practitioners and policymakers with some important insights
about the complex and dynamic nature of this type of cooperation, as
well as ideas for how to improve the processes and subsequent out-
comes of IMC in OOH services.
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